Golden Gate University School of Law

GGU Law Digital Commons
Publications

Faculty Scholarship

12-2000

Saving the African Elephant
Leslie Burton
Golden Gate University School of Law, lburton@ggu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs
Part of the Environmental Law Commons
Recommended Citation
1 Indian J. Envt'l. L. 61 (2000)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Publications by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact jfischer@ggu.edu.

"".

COMPUM£Nl Ai'd

."

.:~.

-.",

~).-l

INDIAN JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
VOL. 1 ISSUE 2 DECEMBER 2000

India Envirnomental Law Capacity Building Project
I. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE
CHAIRMAN

Prof. K.C. Shivaramakrishnan

Dr. S.C. Jain

New Delhi

Secretary, Dept. of Law and Justice
Government of India, New Delhi

MEMBERS

Dr. Vijai Sharma

Prof. N.R. Madhava Menon
Vice Chancellor,
The W.B. National University of
Juridical Sciences, Kolkatta

Joint Secretary
Ministry of Environment and Forests
New Delhi

Dr. Rahmathullah Khan

Dr. G. Mohan Gopal

Rector. Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi

Dr. Bownder

Mr. Rajeev Dhavan

Professor, ASCI
Hyderabad

Senior Advocate
New Delhi

Dr. Amita Dhanda

Director, NLSlU
Bangalore

II. CONSORTIUM MEMBERS
Dr. V.S. Rekhi

Professor of Law and Registrar
NALSAR University Of Law,
3-40761. Barkathpura
Hyderabad-500027
nalsar@hd2.dot.net.in

Director
National Law Institute University
Bhadbhada
Barkherikalam
Bhopal

Dr. Surendra Nath

Dr. N.R. Madhava Menon

Dean, Faculty of Law
Department of Law
Banaras Hindu University
. VARANASI-221005
profsurendra@satyam.net.in

Vice Chancellor. NUJS
Aranya Bhavan, Salt Lake City
Kolkatta-700091

III. CEERA TEAM
Prof. O. V. Nandimath

B.E. Pushpa Kadam

Co-ordinator
CEERA

Library and Documentation Incharge
CEERA

Mr. Sai Ram Bhat
Research Officer
CEERA

CONTENTS
1

About this issue

M.K. Ramesh
ARTICLES

1.

Environment, Agriculture and Challenges of Bio-Piracy:
.
A Blue Print of Indian Sui Generis Legal Order
Md. ZaJar MahJooz Nomani

2.

Need for Restoring the Kumki and Bane Privileges:
Towards Sustainable Development and Biological Diversity
Dr. P. lshwara Bhat

23

3.

Conserving India's Tigers

36

3

Janet Altman
4.

Saving the African Elephant

61

Leslie A. Burton
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Right to a Clean Environment: A Judicial Vindication
Dr. Ali Mehdi
BOOK REVIEW
M.K. Ramesh
·-·Population, Poverty and Environment in North-East India

1.

CASEREvmw
All India Mobile Zoo Owners and Animal Welfare
Association v. Union of India

89

97

SaiRamBhat
100

2.

R.A Goel v. Union of India

100

3.

Bijayananda Patra and Ors v. District Magistrate, Cuttack

100

4.

Church of God (Full Gospel) in India v.
K.K.R. Majestic Colony Welfare Association and others

101

5.

Kennedy Valley Welfare Association v.
Ceylon Repatriates Lal,>ourers Welfare and Service Society

102

6.

Ramji Patel v. Nagrik Upbhokta Marg Darshak Manch

7.

State of Himachal Pradesh v. Smt. Halli Devi

102
102

DRAFT LEGISLATION Sharad Kulkarni
Wildlife (protection)Act, 2000
(Draft Prepared by Voluntary Organisation)

104

SAVING THE AFRICAN ELEPHANT
How to save the African elephant from extinction has been a controversial
issue for over two decades. This article will explain why the African elephant is
dying out, why it should be saved, and how to save it. Part I describes the elephant's
life and habits. Part II explains the causes of the elephant's endangered status.
Part III discusses why the elephant should be saved. Part IV explains the policies
established by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
(CITES)~ Part V explores avenues for saving the elephant. Part VI offers policy
recommendations.

I. The Life of the Africian Elephant
African elephants (Loxodanta africana) are composed of two subspecies.
Sixty percent of them are 'L.a. africana,' which live in the savannas ofeastem
and southern Africa; the other forty percent are 'L.a. cyclotis,' which live in the
rain forests of central and western Africa. I Elephants are social animals. They Ii ve
in tight-knit matriarchal groups of about 10 members, led by the oldest female. 2
Newborn calves weigh about 265 pounds,3 and have very long infancies. They
suckle for 4 years, but remain completely dependent on their mothers until they
are 10.4
The members of the matriarchal group do everything together: feed, Walk,
rest, drink, and wallow in mud.s The females may stay in the same group with
their mothers forever,6 even after the daughters mature and breed.1 If the group
gets too large, some of the females will form a new matriarchal group.8 The
young males stay with their mothers until they are between 10 and 15,9 when they
go out on their own. The older males thus live a more solitary existence than the
females and younger males. lo
Elephants have emotions. Not only are they very social, but they are .
affectionate. They touch each other frequently with their trunks; when they have
not seen each other in a while, they show great excitement, flapping their ears and .
greeting each other by intertwining their trunks. II Elephants mourn thei~ dead by
standing around a dead elephant's body for days, touching it over and over with
their tusks. 12 Then they "bury" the body by covering it with earth and branchesP
Females who lose a calf become depressed and lethargic. 14
Elephants help each other when they are hurt or disabled, even at danger to
themselves. IS They communicate and warn each other by low-pitched sounds
which cannot be heard by people: 6 Scientists believe that the sound carries only
for six miles;11 nevertheless, when a mass killing of elephants occurred in
Zimbabw~, elephants 90 miles away fled. 18
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When the family matriarch or the elders die, the family structure breaks
down}9 Youngsters under 10 die without their mothers. 20 The older juveniles
suffer emotional trauma and, without a role model, never learn how to behave as
adults.21 If the family disintegrates the former members, especially the young,
may become antisocial or aggressive. 22
Elephants are the largest land animal,23 and eat accordingly. They consume
300 pounds of food a day: grasses, roots, bark, and the woody parts of trees. 24
They drink 20 gallons of water a day.25
They are migratory creatures, and roam wide distances searching for food. 26
Elephants continue to grow throughout their lives. 27 The males can grow to 11
feet tall and weigh 6 tons. 28 The females are about half of that size.29 Elephants
can live for 60 years. 3D Both males and females have modified incisor teeth called
"tusks,"31 which may grow straight or curved.32 Elephants use their tusks to forage
for food, dig for water, play, fight (rarely), untangle branches, and clear trees. 33
They have only one set of these tusks,34 which continue to grow during the animal's
entire life. 35 Elephants cannot live without their tusks. 36 Historically the elephant
has had no natural enemies.37 In fact, they are crucial to the ecosystem and the
hundreds of other animal and plant species in Africa. For example, they open up
dense forests by stripping areas of trees to convert them into grasslands, and they
dig water holes. 38 In modem times, however, the elephant has acquired a dangerous
enemy: Man. Man has caused the near demise of the elephant.

II. The Decline of Elephant Populations
The number of African elephants fell from a high. of between 1.3 and 3
million in 1979 to between 500,000 and 700,000 in 1987.39 In 1997, the African
elephant population·was estimated at between 550,000 and 600,000. 40
The endangered status of the elephant has been caused by several factors:
the elephant's habitat disappearing, which endangers the elephants' lives; the
elephant's voracious appetite, which brings it into conflict with Man; the elephant's
enormous size, which makes it dangerous to Man; and its beautiful tusks, which
are valuable to Man. These conflicts did not arise as frequently when the human
population was significantly smaller.41

A. Habitat loss
The strongest threat to elephant survival comes from habitat destruction.
Cynthia Moss, an elephant expert and director of African Wildlife Federation's
Amboseli Elephant Research Project, noted that "The greatest threat to Africa's
elephants ... is loss of range brought about by human population growth and
expansion onto elephant range."42
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Human population density severely and negatively affects elephant population
density.43 As the African population has grown, people have taken control over
land which traditionally was the habitat of the elephant. The elephant's territory
is disappearing due to human activities such as draining wetlands and clearing
forests to create land for agriculture and housing, logging forests for fuel and
timber, and building housing, roads, and highways.44 The problem will worsen as
Africa's human population grows. It is expected to double between 1992 and
2012.45
Expansion for agriculture is pne of the most serious threats to the elephant.46
As Africa has become more agricultural, the elephants' habitat has been
increasingly encroached ,47 especially in tropical forest regions. 48 Not only do people
and elephants compete for the same land, but elephants and cattle compete for the
same food. 49
The elephants' habits contribute to the loss of its habitat. As land is fenced
off or otherwise developed, the elephants cannot migrate freely. Thus they deplete
the habitat in which they are confined: they convert woodland to grassland by
felling trees, with resulting ramifications for other species who live there. 50

B. Conflicts with Humans
Shrinking , habitat has caused elephant-human conflicts, especially those
relating to the elephant's voracious appetite and its migratory habits. African
farmers consider elephants to be pests at best, and dangerous adversaries at worst. 51
Because elephants can destroy an entire season's crop in a few hours,52 farmers
are forced to stay awake all night to chase elephants from their fields. 53 Elephants
have destroyed water pipes, damaged buildings, and even harmed livestock.54
Worse, elephants sometimes attack people. 55 One report claims that they killed
500 people in Zimbabwe in the eight year period between 1982 and 1989.56
Thus
many of the African people have no great love for the elephant, and may kill them
to defend themselves or th~ir livelihood. Some elephant experts have serious doubts
that elephants can be saved in heavily populated farming areas. 57
C. Killing Elephants for Ivory
Aside from habitat loss, killing of elephants for their tusks (ivory) is the
biggest threat to their survival. For hundreds of years, elephant ivory was used for
medicines and aphrodisiacs,58 and for ornaments: jewellery, piano keys, billiard
balls, dice, knife handles, and personalized signature seals considered to be status
symbols in Japan. 59 Although trade in ivory dates back to Roman times, killing
elephants for their tusks became widespread and systematic after the Portuguese·
colonized West Africa in the 1600' S.6O During the 1700's and especially the 1800's,
overhunting seriously depleted the elephant herds, and threatened them with
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extinction, especially in western Africa. 61 In 1897, game laws were enacted to
restrict elephant killing and to allow the elephants to reestablish their populations.62
The elephants indeed rebounded by the middle of the 1900's, aided by a drop in
ivory prices. after World War II.63
Unfortunately for the elephant, ivory prices soared.againin the 1970's. Prices
for raw ivory in the major markets (Japan, Hong Kong, and Europe) rose from
between $3-$10 per pound in the 1960's to $50 a pound in the 1970's.64 High
.ivory prices make poaching attractive to the impoverished African people, because
the price earned from selling a single tusk can equal several years worth of wages. 65
Therefore as prices rose, poaching resumed with a vengeance. The effects were so
severe that, in 1977, the CORvention for International Trade in Endangered Species
(CITES)66 listed the African elephant as an Appendix II animal, one "threatened"
with being endangered, and imposed certain limitations on trade in elephant tusks .
.(CITES is discussed at length in section IV, infra.)
Listing the elephant on Appendix II proved virtually worthless as a means of
protecting the elephant. The worst poaching occurred after the Appendix II listing.
Ivory prices continued to rise, reaching $125 a pound in the 1980's, up to a high
$140 in 1989.67 Poaching was rampant. One thousand tons of ivory left Africa·
each year, 90% of it illegally obtained. 68 During the 1980's the African elephant
popUlation was reduced significantly. Depending on which statistics are used, it
was either by 2/3, from 1.5 million to 500,000,69 by 112, from 1.3 million to 609,000,
or even by 5/6, from 3 million to 600,000.70 Poachers were killing 200 to 300
elephants a day,7I sometimes by mowing down entire herds with machine guns 72
and grenades.73 Some predicted that the African elephant would be extinct by
2000.74
. The massacre of the elephants was not the only reason for the reduction in
elephant population. The dynamics of poaching rebound down the elephant
population, resulting in the indirect death of additional elephants. For example,
poachers kill the oldest elephants first, because they have the largest tusks.7s Mother
elephants with youngsters under 10 constituted 40% of the deaths during the
decade. 76 These youngsters cannot survive without their mothers. In addition, the
older juveniles are traumatized by the killing and, if left alive, wander aimlessly
in despair, without family guidance and discipline, and are likely to cause the.
kind of trouble that will lead to their deaths as welJ.17 The terrified, leaderless
young elephants experience a declining reproduction rate, thus adding to the demise
ofthe species.78 The elephant's entire family structure and way oflife is destroyed.
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The brutality of the killing is horrendous. In the Central African Republic,
Chad, and Sudan, people kill the elephants by first chasing them and slashing the
hamstring muscle in the elephants' legs; then, after the elephants fall helpless to
the ground, they kill them with spears.79 Other people, including guerrilla soldiers,
attack with hand grenades and assault weapons, mowing down entire matriarchal
groups in one fell SWOOp80 They then hack off the elephant's tusks. 81
In 1989, CITES moved the elephant to Appendix I, which offers considerably
more protection than its previous listing on Appendix II.82 Poaching decreased
significantly after the elephant was moved to Appendix 1. In 1997, however, amid
much controversy, three nations were given limited relief from CITES to sell
stockpiled ivory.83 Poaching resumed. 84 (The role of CITES and the "down-listing"
of the elephant will be discussed in section IV, infra.)
D. Culling
Ironically, those who aim to conserve the elephants may also kil1 them as
part of legalized "culling." Culling is the term used for the selective thinning of
the elephant population by ki ling some of the elephant herd. 85
Game wardens kill elephants 'so that the elephant herds will not grow too
large and deplete the vegetation.86 They also kill them to obtain elephant parts
which they will sell for cash, which they then use to assist the local population
and involve it in elephant conservation effortsY Zimbabwe, which claims that its.
conservation efforts have caused its elephant herd to increase, relies heavily on
the money it obtains from culling its herds.
This concept of making the elephants "pay their own way,88 or ensuring the
survival of the species at the expense of some of the individuals,89 is called
sustainable use. Sustainable use will be· discussed in section V, infra.
The process of culling is gruesome. Zimbabwe uses machine guns to kill off
entire female herd groups.90 Because elephants have emotions and mourn their
dead, they are surely traumatized by witnessing this killing. Richard Leakey, the
head of the Kenya Wildlife Service, deplores such killing as immora1. 91
E. Trophy hunting

Trophy hunting is not new; it was known in ancient Rome.92 At the turn of
the Twentieth Century, it was the fashionable sport for wealthy people, including
Theodore Roo~evelt, to kill African animals for their heads, fur, or antlers. 93 Big
game hunters in the pas! were affluent people who could afford to travel great
distances to participate in their sport,94 and there were not many of them. As the
tradition continues, the world's population has increased; travel is easier and costs
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less, so trophy hunting continues and puts pressure on elephants and other wild
African animals. 95 Some trophy hunting is il1egal; but some countries, such as
Zimbabwe, allow it. 96 The countries which allow it earn large fees from hunters. 97

F. Other causes
Problems that have affected the African people, like drought and disease,
also have affected elephant populations. 98 Additionally, elephants are sometimes
killed as part of ritual proof of bravery or as a political protest by the Masai
people of eastern Africa. 99

ID. Why Save the Elephant?
Some argue that money determines the value of things: if people value living
elephants, they will pay money to preserve them; if they value their tusks more,
they will pay for ivory and thus bring about the extinction of elephants. The market
will drive the end result. This "free market" view sees animals (and indeed, all
things) only in terms of their usefulness to Man, especially in the economic sense.
This attitude has resulted in killing the elephant for its tusks. So long as this
attitude persists, the poorer African nations are likely to over-exploit the elephant·
population, and to do so until it is extinct.
Those holding the free market view will support saving the elephant if they
see a monetary benefit for themselves in doing so. If this view can b~ channeled
into an effective sustainable use program, perhaps the economic view can work to
save the elephant. (The sustainable use issue is discussed in section V, infra.)
Some argue that events should be allowed to run their course, and if the
elephant becomes extinct, so be it. Those with this view see no intrinsic value in
having elephants on the earth. Elephants have an intrinsic value, however.
Humanitarian, ethical, aesthetic, and ecological arguments support saving the
elephant.
We should save the elephant for humanitarian and ethical reasons. The World
Charter for Nature proclaimed: "Every form of life is unique, warranting respect
regardless of its worth to man."loo Elephants are living beings with a right to live
on the planet. 101 They are· intelligent mammals with emotions. Mammals feel
pleasure and pain, have perceptions and memories. \02 They are like us. Compassion
dictates that we save them.
We should save the elephant because the existence of all wildlife adds richness
to our own life on the planet. 103 Even people who have never seen an elephant in
the wild may take satisfaction from knowing that elephants exist. 104
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We should save the elephant because of its contribution to the earth's
biological diversity. The earth's ecological stability depends on the existence of a
wide variety of species. lOS The extinction of one plant, for example, can lead to
the disappearance of 30 other plants. 106 A species' extinction, or even its shrinking
gene pool, will cause multiplier effects throughout the food chain.107 The elephant
is a keystone species, lOB that is, a species important to maintaining the stability of
the ecosystems lO9 When a keystone species is eliminated, the ecological system
can collapse. IIO
If the elephant becomes extinct, it will impact the human race as ecological
systems collapse. 11l So ultimately even those who do not care about saving the
elephant may find the~selves personally impacted.

IV.

Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species

The United Nations has embarked on its own effo~s to save the elephant by
regulating the trade in ivory.
In the early 1960's concerned groups of citizens and nations like Kenya
began to garner support for an international convention to protect endangered
species (and their products) ftom commercial trade. 112 In 1963 the United Nations
resolved to draft a multilateral treaty,113 and in 1973 it enacted the Convention of
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).114
CITES became effective in July, 1975. lIS
CITES regulates the international trade in endangered species with the aim
of preventing any species from becoming extinct because of trade. I 16 It does this
by establishing a system of import and export permits which a member country
must obtain to trade in threatened wildlife.1l7 The permit requirements limit
international trade in listed species. The species are categorized into three lists:
Appendices I, II, and III.IIB Appendix I covers species threatened by extinction. 119
Appendix II covers animals with special needs; i.e. those who are not presently
threatened with extinction but may be in the future. 120 Appendix III covers animals
which are subject to some regulation to prevent exploitation. l21
Appendix I listing gives the strictest protection to animals. It requires import
and export permits for any aniinal products from an animal listed in
Appendix 1.122 The permits cannot be issued by any member cOllntry unless the
removal of the species will not be detrimental to the species' survival and the
product will not be used primarily for commercial purposes.1 23
Appendix II offers an intermediate level of protection. Trade in Appendix II
species is subject to some control but no import requirements exist. To obtain an
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export permit, one need show only that the trade is not detrimental to the species'
survival and that no laws were broken. 124 Trade for commercial purposes is
allowed. m
Appendix m offers the least protection. It allows countries to unilaterally
enact legislation to protect animals within their own jurisdiction to restrict
exploitation. 126 Export permits are required only from the countries which have
chosen to list a species on Appendix III, not from other countries which may have
the same animal living within their boundaries. 127
The African elephant was first listed in CITES in February 4, 1977, on
Appendix II.128 Thus limited trade in ivory was permitted, so long as the permit
requirements were met. Additionally, an Ivory Export Quota System was adopted
in connection with the listing of the elephant on Appendix II, under which member
countries were expected to impose export quotas for ivory.'29
Unfortunately, the quota system was voluntary and was not followed. 130 Only
sixteen of thirty-five African parties complied with the quota. 131 Several nations
ignored the quota and exported as much ivory as they could produce.132
Additionally, corrupt officials flouted the laws, and falsified permits were
.. common. 133 As a result of weak controls and soaring ivory prices, more than half
of Africa's elephants were killed for their tusks. (See discussion in section I1I.B,
supra.)

The rampant poaching and the international public outcry that arose caused
CI~S to "up-list" the African elephant to Appendix I in 1989. 134 Because this
up-listing of the elephant severely restricted trade in ivory, it was commonly
referred to as the "ivory ban."
Support for the ivory ban was so great that ivory prices started to drop
drainatically even before the Convention voted on it. 13S Prices dropped from $140
a pound in April 1989 to $5 a pound after the ban was imposed.1 36 Poaching .
decreased, and the number of illegally killed elephants decreased as dramatically
as .the prices: in Kenya, for example, the number decreased from hundreds ·per
year in the 1980's to 36 in 1990, and 17 in 1991. 137
After the ivory ban was instituted, Mrican nations such as Zimbabwe could
still "cull" their herds,'38 but could not sell the ivory on the international market.
These nations stockpiled their ivory, and the stockpiles grew to 470 ton~ by 1997.139The stOCkpiling nations therefore actively lobbied CITES for permission to resume
their international ivory trade. 140 Zimbabwe sought an end to the ivory ban so that
it could resume its lucrative sales of ivory to Japan, the largest consumer of ivory. 141
Zimbabwe, a poor nation, claimed that the stockpiles were a vital economic
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resource. 142 It also argued that the sales would have a beneficial effect on elephant
conservation because part of the proceeds would be put back into elephant
conservation. 143
In June, 1997, CITES held its biennial meeting in Zimbabwe. At the meeting
the nations of Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Botswana moved to transfer their elephant
populations from Appendix I to Appendix II.144 A CITES Panel of Experts,
appointed to study the issue, claimed that the elephant populations of thos~ three
counties were not endangered and should be "down-listed" to Appendix II.14s The
United States and some other countries opposed the down-listing because of fears
of a resurgence in poaching, 146 w~ich generally occurs whenever ivory sales are
allowed. Nonetheless, the CITES parties voted to down-list the elephant
populations of the three moving nations to Appendix II and to allow them to
export raw ivory to Japan after March 18, 1999, {tinder a quota system, and on
certain conditions including compliance with monitoring and identification
procedures).147 The money from the exports to Japan must to be used for elephant
conservation, monitoring, and capacity building programs. 148
The CITES parties also voted to allow all of the elephant range countries to
.conduct a one-time sale of government-owned ivory stockpiles for non-commercial
. purposes.149 The hope is that donor countries and organizations will buy the ivory
and perhaps destroy it. ISO
Some commentators believe that the CITES parties were swayed mostly by
the economic needs of the poverty-stricken moving countries, rather than by the
strength of elephant population numbers. 151 Article I of CITES allows this result:
it provides that the Parties may take the countries' economic and social problems
into account when considering species' status as endangered. 152
The danger of allowing any ivory sales is that it gives incentives to poaching
and makes it easier for poachers to sell their bounty. This scenario was played out.
In anticipation of the ban's ending, poachers killed hundreds of elephants in a
machine gun attack five months before the CITES vote. IS3 Poachers arrested in
the Congo on the eve of the meeting told the rangers that they had heard that ivory
sales were resuming. 154 Following the down-listing, poaching immediately resumed
throughout Afri~a.lSs (The sale of ivory as an incentive to poaching is discussed
in section V.B.I., infra.)

V. Potential Solutions
This section will examine potential solutions which might save the elephant:
preservationism, conservationism, reducing demand through public education,
and foreign funding.
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A. Preservation ism
Preservationism seeks to protect elephants by setting aside particular areas
(national parks or game preserves) where elephants can live without humans to
interfere, 156 except to protect them and look at them. Absolute protection against
poachers is implicit. and trade in elephant parts is prohibited. 157 Tourists pay to
see the elephants, which provides revenue to protect the elephants, and yields
substantial profits for the host country.
Kenya is a strong practitioner of the preservationism policy. Many of its
elephants live in protected preserves. The Government of Kenya had a great
incentive to protect the elephant because the Government earns many millions of
dollars in revenue from the elephant through tourism. 15s
Kenya has struggled to protect its elephants. In the 1970's it passed laws
prohibiting the killing of elephants. 159 It also banned the sale of ivory and alI other
elephant products. 160 These measures proved ineffective in the 1980's when ivory
prices were high. Poaching occurred there as it did elsewhere in Africa. In fact.
Kenya's elephant population declined from 65,000 to 19,000. 161
Some of the poaching resulted from Kenya's geographical positioning. Kenya
is surrounded by some of the poorest nations on earth: Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan,
and Uganda. Poachers from these nations frequently crossed the border to obtain
an easy supply of ivory from Kenya. 162 Further. underpaid rangers were susceptible
to bribes, and some personally participated in poaching to augment their incomes. 163
Corrupt government officials funneled off the fees paid by tourists, and did not
pass them on to the parks to protect the elephants. 164
Starting in 1988. however, Kenya substantially improved its preservation
efforts. It committed more money to the effort. It erected electrified fences to
surround its elephant population: 65 It reorganized its park service: 66 It issued
automatic weapons and new vehicles to the rangers. 167 It paid for surveillance
aircraft. 168 It instituted an anti-poaching policy of "shooting to kill" any poachers
caught in the act. 169 It supported the ivory ban, and then demonstrated its
commitment to the ivory ban in 1989 by burning $3 million in confiscated ivory
rather than selling it. 170 Poaching declined significantly. Of course, with the institute
of the "ivory ban," the demand for ivory dropped and may and may have been the
true reason for the decline in poaching. 171 These security measures are costly. In
fact, one of the problems with the preservationist policy is its high cost. The cost
. has been estimated at $200-400 per square kilometre of elephant habitat, assuming
that there is one ranger for every 50 square kilometres and that the rangers are
paid salaries high enough to avoid corruption. 172 For all of the African parks and
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preserves, this would amount to more than $ 100 million per year. 173 Most African
countries, due to political unrest, poverty, and lack of infrastructure, cannot expect
to have the high level of tourism that Kenya has,174 thus creating a catch-22:
Without the money, they cannot afford the inftastructure to preserve the elephant;
without the infrastructure, they cannot make the money to preserve the elephant.
Another problem with the preservationist view is its failure to include local
populations in any meaningful way in elephant preservation programs. The money
paid by tourists to view the elephants in the parks goes to the rangers and the
government, not the local people. 175 Although the Kenya government plans to use
funds from tourism for schools, health clinics, and water systems,176 these benefits
are not direct enough to give the local people an incentive to protect the elephant- 177
Because of the failure to involve local people, many impoverished African nations
view preservationism as an unwarranted attempt by the wealthier developed nations
to impose western views on them. 178
A few years ago, Kenya paid' the Masai to move out of one of the watering
areas in Amboseli National Park. 179 This is not 'the kind of continuing financial
incentive that is necessary to truly involve local people in the fate of the elephant~
More recently, though, Kenya has moved to share its tourism revenue more directly
with the Masai and other local people affected by the elephants. The Masai living
around Amboseli National Park, for example, receive $60,000 a year from camping
fees. ISO Tourism also can provide employment in hotels, camps, lodges, ~s well as
income from selling crafts and performing traditional dances. lSI Preservationist
policy will work best when those who live near the elephant have direct and
positive incentives to protect them. When the locals have no such incentive, the
government must erect electrified fences, enforce shoot-to-kill laws, and incur
high enforcement costs. The local people must have a carrot, not just a stick.

B. Conservationist/sustainable use
Conservationism means to use a product judiciously and carefully, so that it
is not depleted; to use organic resources more slowly than they can reproduce. 182
With regard to the elephants, this concept has been called "sustainable use."183
Advocates of sustainable use treat elephants as a renewable resource to be utilized.
Their goal is that the elephant population will remain relatively stable, while the
local citizens and the economy benefit from using elephant products. Under the
sustainable use philosophy, elephants are actively managed. Rangers protect them
from random killing, but participate in or allow managed killing, called "culling,"
to prevent the elephant population from becoming too large. The culling is limited
so that the elephants will not be killed at a rate higher than they can reproduce. 184
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Culling is also a fund-raiser: when the elephants are killed, their tusks (and other
body parts) are sold to earn money so the elephants can "pay their own way" for
their maintenance. 18S
Zimbabwe is a leading practitioner of the sustainable use method, along with
South Africa, Botswana, Malawi, and Namibia. '86 These five countries are the
only nations out of the 36 in Africa which claim to have stable elephant
populations. 187 Zimbabwe asserts that its elephant population increased from 30,000
iilI960 188 to 43,000 in 1987 189 to 52,000 in 1989,190 and that it continues to increase
5% a year. In 1998, Zimbabwe's elephant population was estimated at 67,000. 191
Zimbabwe claims that its elephant conservation methods have been successful
in part because its herds are culled regularly to prevent the herds from becoming
too large. The Government gi ves scientific advice as to the appropriate number of
culls and supervises the culls to assure that they are not excessive. 192
Zimbabwe uses part of the profits from the sales ofthe dead elephants' tusks
to pay for conservation programs. 193 One program which has had some success
has been a non-profit program called CAMPFIRE (Communal Areas Management
Programme for Indigenous Resources).I94
Under CAMPFIRE, the local people are given incentives to protect the
elephant. 19' The locals manage the elephants in their area, with technical assistance
ftom the CAMPFIRE organization. 196 Each year the elephants are counted, and
the local people are allowed to cull 1% of them. 197 The ivory is sold, and a portion
of the sales proceeds is then paid to the local people, who can then use them to
buy otherwise unaffordable social services. 198 Some of the money is used to
compensate individuals who have sustained crop damage. 199 The rest is used for
national wildlife protection.2°O The elephant meat is also sold at cost to the locals.201
Instead of (or in addition to) culling, some CAMPFIRE programs earn money by
selling hunting licences. Hunters pay sizable fees for the licences,202 and an even
more sizable "trophy" fee for any animal they actually kill.203
In still other CAMPFIRE programs, villagers share in the proceeds of tourist
activities, including obtaining employment in the tourist industry.204 This approach
is the most preferable because it does not tie monetary proceeds to killing elephants.
One local CAMPFIRE program was so successful at involving the locals that the
. people reportedly moved their settlement and made it more centralized so that the
elephants would have more space. 20S Actions like this reconcile the elephant, the
people, and the shrinking habitat. People will not poach. nor allow others to do
so, when they have a common interest in preserving the elephant.
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Zimbabwe's approach raises two issues, however: whether culling is ethical,
and whether legalized ivory sales encourage poaching.
1. Ethical dilemma of culling

Many conservationists argue that cu1ling is necessary to control the size of
the elephant population. They credit it with keeping Zimbabwe's elephant
population viable,206 while also earning money for the human population.207
Others believe that culling is abhorrent and morally reprehensible. Entire
matriarchal herds of emotional, affectionate, family-oriented mammals are mowed
down with machine guns. Richard Leakey abhors the practice, saying, "[E]lephants .
are intelligent, social creatures. Can we morally justify such killing? I think not. "208
Zimbabwe has stopped allowing reporters to witness this killing, fearing the outcry
that would result.209
Further, those who argue that culling is necessary often have a conflict of .
interest. Because countries can benefit financially from culling, they have an
incentive to inflate their elephant population figures and exaggerate the need for
culling. When Zimbabwe has surplus elephants, it can kill Olore of them and sell
more ivory. The ethics of killing are especially questionable when it is done not
to preserve the herd, but solely as a moneymaking enterprise.
Added to the culling dilemma is the difficulty of accurately counting
elephants. Elephants are migratory animals, capable of travelling many miles in a
day,2lD and do not respect national boundaries. Thus they can be counted twice by
two different countries. 211 The elephants who live in the rain forests are especially
difficult to count, as they often cannot be seen even by air surveillance.212 Cynthia
Moss found elephants challenging to count even when they were standing still,
because their massive bulk can readily conceal other elephants standing behind
them.213
The difficulty of accurately counting elephants calls into question Zimbabwe's
claim that its elephant popUlation has been increasing dramatically. Although many
commentators accept Zimbabwe's pronouncements without question, two elephant
experts have criticized Zimbabwe's figures: lain Douglas-Hamilton (formerly of
th~ World Wildlife Fund'~ Elephant Project) and Richard Leakey. DouglasHamilton doubts that elephants can reproduce fast enough to generate the kind of
population increase that Zimbabwe claims. 214 Leakey notes that Zimbabwe's past
failure to accurately count its rhinoceroses gives rise to skepticism about its
counting of elephants. 21S
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Zimbabwe killed 44,000 elephants between 1960 and 1989,216 and plans to
kill about 5,000 a year on an ongoing basis.217 During the ivory ban, however,
Zimbabwe claimed to have reduced its culling operations. 218 If its elephant
population were increasing, its need to cull the elephants should have remained
steady, regardless of whether the ivory could be sold legally. If Zimbabwe actually
reduced culling during this period, the reduction demonstrates that culling is not
for population cpntrol, but for profit.
Allowing hunting may be a feasible compromise position. Although countries
like Zimbabwe have been criticized for allowing elephants to be hunted, hunting
is more humane than the massacres that occur through machine-gun culling and
poaching, and far fewer elephants are killed.219
Elephant contraception is an idea for the future. Scientists are experimenting
with different products, but have so far been unable to develop a realistically
workable birth control method for elephants.22o When they do, elephant populations
.
can be kept in check without any need for culling.

2. Ivory sales as an incentive to poaching
Because all ivory looks alike, legalized ivory sales lead to increased poaching.
Legally obtained ivory ordinarily cannot be distinguished from illegally obtained
ivory.221 Although isotope analysis can identify ivory with the accuracy of the
finger-printing technique used for people, it is difficult and prohibitively
expensive.222 Illegally obtained ivory therefore can be "laundered" by being sold
along with legitimate ivory sales;223 sold with phony paperwork ;224 or carved into
decorative "worked ivory," which is subject to less stringent regulations than raw
.
ivory. 225
Because illegal ivory cannot practicably be distinguished from legal ivory,
allowing any ivory sales encourages poaching. When the ivory ban was modified
to allow limited trading in stockpiled ivory, poaching increased throughout
Africa. 226 Poachers in Zimbabwe, anticipating the ban's being lifted, machinegunned hundreds of elephants five months before the voting. 227 Shortly after the
ban was lifted, Ghana reported its first poaching in eight years, and five elephants
were poached in Kenya.228
Of course, making ivory illegal does not eliminate the demand for ivory any
more that making drugs illegal has eliminated the demand for drugS.229 But it
makes it riskier to deal in ivory and thus decreases poachingPO

C. Ending demand through education and consumer awareness
So long as ivory sales are legalized, elephants will be killed for their tusks.
poaching will stop only when it is not worthwhile to kill elephants: that is. when
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ivory has little monetary value. Ivory will lose its monetary value when the demand
for ivory decreases significantly. The demand will decrease if so much ivory enters
the market that supply exceeds demand, or if consumers stop buying ivory.
The first alternative, allowing so much ivory to flood the market that demand
drops, would be counter-productive. It would mean allowing unlimited ivory sales,
with the goal of increasing the supply so greatly that the prices would drop as the
supply exceeded the demand. Elephants would be killed in epic proportions. A
blood bath occurred in the 1980's even though ivory officially was subject to
regulation; the same or worse can be expected if ivory sales are allowed again in
impoverished countries. If killing were to return to its pre-1989 level, the elephant's
demise would be virtually assured.23I The more attractive alternative is to educate
the public so that the demand for ivory ceases. Public awareness, in fact, was an
important factor in up-listing the elephant at CITES in 1989.232 The public needs
to be informed of the continuing danger to elephants and encouraged to rally
against ivory sales.
In the United States and Europe, the public already has a high level of
awareness of the ivory issue and has used its clout to protect endangered species.
Jewellers stopped selling ivory products in response to publicity by the African
Wildlife Foundation.233 Sotheby's of New York City and Liberty'S of London
ceased dealing in ivory because of pressure from customers and
environmentalists. 234 Repeated publicity about the endangered elephant created a
sense of moral outrage which made buying or owning ivory socially unacceptable,
thus quashing the demand for ivory.235
The same is .not true of Japan which, before the ivory ban, was the largest
consumer of ivory.236 and faced a steadily increasing demand.237 In Japan and
other Asian countries, the demand for ivory was high for cultural reasons: for
centuries ivory has been used, not only for decorative purposes, but for medicinal
and religious purposes as well. 238 Deeply-entrenched cultural norms do not change
easily in Asia, especially not at the hand of Westerners seeking to impose Western
ideals. Asian countries have viewed Western efforts to save endangered species
as cultural imperialism. 239
Asian nations are becoming more educated about endangered species,
however. The demand for ivory has decreased,240 and several Japanese department
store chains have curtailed sales of ivory products. 241 A co-operative effort between
the World Wildlife Fund and the American College of Traditional Chinese
Medicine has used community-based educators to promote conservation to AsianAmerican and other Asian popUlations in a culturally sensitive way.242 Asian
environmental groups are becoming more active, and have focused on integrating .
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Buddhist ideas of harmony between people and animals as a basis for protecting
endangered species.243 Jackie Chan, a well-known Hong Kong martial arts expert
and comedy actor, has been using his fame to talk to his audiences and fans about
the endangered rhinoceros and tiger, and has appeared in public service
announcements. 244
Demand also will decrease when ivory substitutes are readily available and
accepted. In 1990 a Japanese professor invented artificial ivory which looks and
feels like authentic ivory.245 Some piano manufacturers, such as Yamaha, no longer
use ivory, but are replacing it with a synthetic resin.246 Convincing consumers to
accept and to prefer synthetic ivory will reduce the demand for ivory.
In any event, the public awareness campaigns must be global in their scope.
If consumers believe that buying ivory is morally wrong, or are embarrassed to
buy it, the demand for ivory will decrease.

D. Foreign Funding to Protect the Elephants
Africa's poverty and political instability are at the source of much of its
elephant problem.247 Foreign funding can help reduce the poverty that drives the
locals to kill the elephants. Africa's impoverished people have many reasons to
kill the elephants, and no reason to protect them. They kill elephants because they
see them as enormous and dangerous pests who destroy their crops, and they kill
them for their ivory. They have little or no incentive to protect elephants because
they receive no economic benefits from doing so. Even if they wanted to protect .
the elephants, they do not have the funds to help them do SO.248
One way to help increase prosperity while also protecting the elephants is to
involve the locals in the tourism industry, including photo safaris and limited
hunting safaris. Involvement in these activities would allow them to reap real
economic benefits from living near the elephants. 249 Unfortunately, however, many
nations do not have the resources to increase tourism or to protect the elephants.2so
Foreign funding canhelp the local people to protect the elephants while also
helping them to become more prosperous. Of course, the revenue from the sale of
the stockpiled ivory to Japan and d.onor nations is supposed to be used to aid
elephant conservation. 2S1 In addition, the developed nations must contribute
financial aid to enable the poor nations to protect the elephant population, while
simultaneously helping the local populations rise out of poverty.
..
Strong commitments from developed nations are necessary.2S2 CITES could
administer a fund to disburse money to countries which make good
faith efforts to protect their elephant populations.253 The fund could assist in
est~blish and
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building and maintaining the infrastructure necessary to support tourism; to train
employees; etc. The fund could help buy land to create protected reserves for
elephants away from agricultural areas, and help farmers learn new farming
methods which protect their crops from elephants. 2s4 It also could compensate
countries for any losses they have from eliminating ivory sales.m
To the extent that ivory sales continue, funds are needed to assist with
registering, monitoring, and controlling them. CITES Decision lO.2 calls upon
donor nations to provide funding for these administrative details. 256 Without these
funds the African nations cannot sufficiently carry out the monitoring2S1 and the
danger of poaching will increase.
If the monitoring is inefficient, or the demand for ivory continues, strong
anti-poaching measures will be needed.2S8 Security measures are expensive. The
United States, Japan, and several non-governmental organizations already provide
substantial foreign assistance to Kenya to protect its elephants with guards,
weapons, fences, and vehicies.2S9 Similar financial assistance to other nations is
necessary as well.

Bringing economic prosperity to the African nations would be the best
solution to the elephant dilemma. 260 Economic prosperity resulting from elephant
conservation not only would give the people the incenti ve to protect the elephants,
but also would generate the resources needed to do continue to do SO.261
If the developed countries truly care about preserving the elephant, they
should help to pay the elephants' way, because their past demand for ivory is
largely responsible for the elephants' plight.

VL Conclusions and Recommendations
Saving the elephants is a complex issue impacted by poverty, cultural norms,
and economic considerations.
Any programs to save the elephant must actively involve the local populations.
The local people must have a stake in managing the elephants, and accrue direct
economic benefits from keeping elephants healthy. These economic benefits can
come from tourism, limited hunting, and foreign funding. None of these goals are
counter-productive to economic development. Properly managed conservation
efforts can ultimately increase African prosperity. Economic prosperity for Africans
not only is a laudable goal in and of itself, but it also will end the need to kill
elephants.
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Education and awareness also are necessary. Not only mustthe local people
be taught the benefits of elephant conservation, but the world must be taught
about the plight of the elephant and the necessity of reducing, then eliminating,
the demand for ivory.
Developed nations will not save the elephant by imposing their wills on the
African nations. Ultimately, the entire global community must work together to
protect this unique, intelligent, endangered animal.

- Leslie A. Burton
Leslie A. Burton, Lecturer, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco,
California. BA, magna cum laude, University of Portland (1976); JD, cum laude,
Santa Clara La,w School (1979); LL.M. candidate, Golden Gate University.
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